Introduction

Historical background
Early investigators of realizability were interested in metamathematical questions. In keeping with the traditions of the time they concentrated on interpretations of one formal system in another. They considered an ad hoc collection of increasingly ingenious interpretations mainly to establish consistency, independence and conservativity results. van Oosten's contribution to the Workshop (see van Oosten 56] and the extended account van Oosten 57]) gave inter alia an account of these concerns from a modern perspective. (One should also draw attention to realizability used to provide interpretations of Brouwer's theory of Choice Sequences. An early approach is in Kleene Vesley 28] ; for modern work in the area consult Moschovakis 35] , 36], 37].)
In the early days of categorical logic one considered realizability as providing models for constructive mathematics; while the metamathematics could be retrieved by`coding' the models, that aspect took a back seat. In the rst instance realizability provided toposes, that is models for impredicative constructive type theory; but it also can be used to model stronger systems of impredicative constructive set theory. In time it was recognized that the mathematical structures arising from realizability provided models (not just for Choice Sequences but) for a variety of exotic non-classical theories of interest. Work in the categorical tradition then focused in particular on models for impredicative polymorphic calculi such as System F ( Girard 12] ) and the Calculus of Constructions (Coquand and Huet 7] ), and on Synthetic Domain Theory (Hyland 20] and Taylor 50]). The use of realizability in this context has a quite di erent character from its earlier metamathematical use. For details of realizability models of impredicative type theories the reader may consult Crole 8] . Domain theory in a realizability context has been treated in the dissertations of Rosolini 46] , Phoa 39] , Longley 32] ; recent progress along one particular line is described in van Oosten and Simpson 58] . For formal expositions of Synthetic Domain Theory informed by the realizability experience see Reus 42] and Reus and Streicher 43] .
The focus of this paper is on the axiom of choice 8x 2 X:9y 2 Y: (x; y) ! 9f 2 Y X :8x 2 X: (x; f(x)) :
I shall call this the propositional axiom of choice to distinguish it from the axiom of choice as it holds in Martin-L of type theory (see Martin-L of 34]), that is in the propositions-as-types sense. 1 We write the instance of the axiom above as AC(X ! Y ).
The models I consider are not new. Some are derived from old interpretations, while I lectured on others in the Netherlands in 1982. 2 My motivation for rehearsing the ideas now is generally that the range of possibilities which, on the one hand, may be used for establishing metamathematical results, and on the other, model exotic non-classical mathematical or computational phenomena, deserves to be better known. When I rst thought about abstract approaches to realizability I was sure that at the very least the old techniques would bene t from being put in more mathematically elegant form; except for Scott and his students few took this view at the time. Now a new generation seems to take all that for granted. Evidence of that was provided by the penetrating comments of the referees of this paper. I am grateful for those improvements which they have stimulated, and am acutely aware that I have not satis ed them in everything.
Maietti's question
A more speci c motivation for this paper is that I have been stimulated by a question put to me by Maria-Emilia Maietti. Maietti's question arose naturally from her work ( see in particular Maietti 33] ) in type theory; but in categorical form 3 her question is essentially this.
How close to the structure of a topos can one get with the propositional axiom of choice holding, but not the law of the excluded middle? One can make this question more precise by asking for a category T of types plus a poset bration P ! T giving a notion of proposition satisfying the following.
The category T of types is locally cartesian closed: so we interpret dependent type theory with strong equality types. P ! T is the subobject bration: propositions correspond exactly to subobjects in T: so propositions are proof irrelevant types.
There is a weak subobject classi er 2 T: thus in the type theory, impredicative higher types are expressed via a weakly generic Prop : Type. 1 Of course in Martin-L of type theory we do not have an axiom but rather a theorem. 2 Robin Grayson also worked on clean forms of old interpretations around this time; and shortly afterwards Jaap van Oosten studied more subtle interpretations from an abstract point of view. 3 For accounts of Type Theories and the connection with categories and brations, consult the recent books Jacobs 25] and Taylor 51] .
The propositional axiom of choice (as above) holds at all types of T.
T has coequalizers of equivalence relations: so we have a form of quotient types. To get the full force of quotients in dependent type theory these should satisfy a stability condition. Finally we want all the above but with constructive or intuitionistic logic: more precisely the subobject lattices P(X) for X 2 T should be Heyting algebras but not generally Boolean algebras. In this paper we get nowhere near satisfying these requirements; but before explaining our more modest aims, it seems worth making some comments on the original problem.
First if coequalizers of equivalence relations are e ective then a quotient of the weak subobject classi er will be a subobject classi er in the strong topos theoretic sense. Thus we would have a topos. (Of course conversely coequalizers are e ective in any topos.) Now in a topos the axiom of choice implies the law of excluded middle. (This was observed by Diaconescu. For arguments in the internal logic of toposes see Scott 47] or in the constructive set theory tradition Goodman and Myhill 14] .)
Secondly the speci c formulation given above may not be fair to Maietti: she has certainly considered variations, some of which she may prefer from the point of view of type theory. Note in particular that the assumption that the types form a locally cartesian closed category gives an extensional type theory. In the presence of extensionality, the constructive signi cance of the propositional axiom of choice becomes problematic. With extensionality we have the following basic facts (see Troelstra 52] Maietti 33] shows that even in the predicative setting of Martin-L of Type Theory one can apply Diaconesu's argument: e ective quotients and uniqueness of equality proofs yields the excluded middle.
Aims
I aim in this paper to describe some realizability models (arising from various realizability toposes) in which some form of the propositional axiom of choice holds. The kind of structure which arise easily satisfy the following.
The category T of types forms a locally cartesian closed category.
The propositional axiom of choice holds for a poset bration P ! T of
propositions. The category T of types is closed under (stable) quotients of propositional equivalence relations. This falls so far short of Maietti's requirements as to be almost ridiculous.
Indeed if we did not require P ! T posetal, we would be satis ed with the standard bration T 2 ! T for a locally cartesian closed T with coequalizers.
We shall have here to put up with non-standard propositions and we certainly nd nothing like a weak classi er for these propositions. Of course we can extract some old style metamathematical information out of the models either directly or in conjunction with standard proof theoretic technique. But I do not do that and instead concentrate on conveying the basics.
This paper arose out of a talk at a Tutorial Workshop. Such events are always more Workshop than Tutorial, but I hope to make redress here by giving some sense of how one thinks about realizability models. Dana Scott rst promoted the idea of thinking of realizability in terms of non-standard truth-values. The obvious analogy is with complete Boolean algebras and Boolean-valued models: realizability toposes and the like are what you get when you take that analogy seriously. As they are mathematical structures we can certainly argue about them`from the outside'. But they can also be regarded as worlds of constructive mathematics; and we get more insight when we can identify (analogues of) standard mathematical arguments which are valid in the internal logic. Often one does not use the full formalism of the internal language; the idea of the internal argument is usually a su cient guide. I hope to provide an instructive example.
2 Realizability: Variations
Tripos extensions and geometric morphisms
A tripos is a notion of generalized proposition encapsulated in an indexed preordered set P over a category S which for the purposes of this paper we take to be the category of sets. The basic notion is due to Pitts 40] and an account of the basic theory is in 21]. The fundamental properties of interest are as follows.
Each P(I) models propositional intuitionistic logic. And for u : J ! I in S, reindexing along u gives a map u : P(I) ! P(J) of preordered sets preserving the propositional operations. There is a generic proposition 2 P(P). Any generalised proposition 2 P(I) is a reindexing of along some I ! P. Given a tripos P over S one constructs a topos S P], which is obtained from S by formally adding subobjects to sets I 2 S to represent the (equivalence classes of) elements of P(I), and then adding quotients of equivalence relations. The objects of the topos S P] are of the form (X; j = j) where j = j 2 P(X X) is a non-standard equality; elements x of X have a nonstandard extent or degree of existence jx 2 Xj = jx = xj 2 P(X). Remarks 2. There other ways to construct realizability toposes. These involve rather di erent starting points. Generally the issue of quotients can be handled in terms of the fundamental notion of the exact completion (see Carboni 6] and Robinson and Rosolini 45] ). 3. As observed independently at least by Scott and Prawitz (see Scott 47] ) all the basic operations of intuitionistic logic can be de ned in second order logic using just ! and 8. Hence a tripos is determined up to equivalence of structure by the interpretation of !, 8 and the generic predicate. This is particularly useful as realizability provides natural interpretations of just this structure.
As a consequence of this last remark the operations >, ! and 8 play a special role in work on realizability toposes: one should think of them as the basic operations and the others as derived operations. To bring this out I shall refer to >, ! and 8 as the functional operations.
Geometric morphisms
The notion of geometric morphism of toposes has a natural counterpart for triposes. Suppose that P and R are triposes. A geometric morphism f : R ! P consists of an adjoint pair of indexed functors f : R ! P and f : P ! R, f a f , with f left exact. (For our preordered sets left exact amounts to preserving > and^.) A geometric morphism of triposes (f a f ) : R ! P induces a geometric morphism (f a f ) : S R] ! S P] of the corresponding toposes.
The category of sheaves over a locale is given up to equivalence as a tripos extension 6 and tripos extensions share some properties with localic extensions. In particular geometric morphisms between such extensions are localic. Proposition 2.1 If (f `f ) : R ! P is a geometric morphism of triposes, then the induced geometric morphism (f a f ) : S R] ! S P] is localic. Proof. This is immediate as a geometric morphism of toposes (f `f ) : F ! E is localic if and only if every object F 2 F is covered by a subobject of a f E for some E 2 E. 
Inclusions
By analogy with the notion for geometric morphisms, say that a geometric morphism (f `f ) : R ! P of triposes is an inclusion of triposes and that R is a subtripos of S just when f re ects the order (equivalently when the counit f f ! 1 R is an isomorphism). (As usual we shall adopt this terminology even when we do not literally have R S.) In the same vein, (f `f ) : R ! P is a surjection just when f re ects the order (equivalently the unit 1 P ! f f is an isomorphism). Any geometric morphism factors as a surjection followed by an inclusion.
If R ! P is an inclusion then it is easy to see that the basic functional operators of R are the restriction of those in P; and moreover that R is an exponential ideal in P in the sense that whenever 2 P and 2 R then ! 2 R. 8 Let us say that a tripos R is a functional substructure of a tripos P just when each R(I) P(I) and when the basic functional operations of R are the restrictions of those of P.
It is an elementary but important fact (important especially for realizability triposes) that if R is a functional substructure of P and an exponential ideal in 6 This goes back to Higgs 15] : the tripos to topos construction mimics the H-valued sets approach to sheaves. 7 The proof is given in detail in Awodey, Birkedal and Scott 1].
P then R is a subtripos of P. We explain this in some detail as it is an example of a proof obtained by consideration of some internal mathematics.
The inclusion map i : R ! P respects the basic tripos operations (>, ! and 8). We ask more signi cantly whether it preserves limits. By this we mean what is generally meant in the case of bred categories: h : R ! P preserves limits just when pointwise each h I : R(I) ! P(I) preserves nite limits; and h commutes with the right adjoints 8 u .
There is no problem with the second of these, but the rst is clear only in special cases. However we can hope! On this basis we try to construct a left adjoint i : P ! R using the adjoint functor theorem. In its poset or preordered set interpretation that suggests a formula of the form i (p) =^fr 2 R j p i (r)g :
We transform this (as in the coding of algebraic or inductive data types in second order -calculus) into the formula i (p) = 8r 2 R:(p ! r) ! r in the tripos logic. (One should read this in an indexed fashion: if p 2 P(I) then the quanti cation is over the set R(I).) Formally we calculate this expression for i (p) in P; but as R forms an exponential ideal, the answer is in R. Now we need to check things. 
The adjunction i ( )` if and only if `i ( ).
The de nition of a tripos says in e ect that it is sound for intuitionistic logic; so these proofs establish the adjunction.
Left exactness i (>) = > and i ( 
This translates into the conditions >`8r:(> ! r) ! r and 8r:(( ! ) ! r) ! r`(8r:( ! r) ! r) ! :
The proof trees demonstrating these are easy and we omit them. The above discussion proves the following.
Theorem 2.3 If a tripos R is a functional substructure of a tripos P and an exponential ideal in P, then R is a subtripos of P.
Basic realizability triposes
We take the point of view of categorical logic: so we use realizability (or other functional interpretations) to provide a tripos. We recall the basic set-up. Let (A; ) be a partial combinatory algebra (PCA). We de ne the indexed family P(I) of preordered sets as follows. First we de ne an internal implication on the power set P(A) by setting p ! q = fc 2 A j 8a 2 p: (c a) 2 qg 2 P(A) for each p; q 2 P(A). Then we set P(I) = (P(I);`) = (P (A) I ;`) where for ; 2 P(A) I we de ne ` if and only if \ i2I (i) ! (i) 6 = ; :
The crucial feature of this de nition is that while the underlying set of P(I) is given as the I-indexed power P(A) I , the preorder is not de ned pointwise.
The easy properties of this realizability are as follows.
Each P(I) models minimal logic with implication de ned pointwise. And for u : J ! I in S, reindexing along u gives a map u : P(I) ! P(J) of preordered sets preserving implication.
For u : J ! I in S we have adjoints 9 u a u a 8 u satisfying the BeckChevalley condition. (These are essentially given by union and intersection; but partial combinatory algebras force us to be a bit more subtle.)
There is a generic proposition 2 P(P(A)) given by (p) = p.
By Remark 3 in 2.1, this is enough to generate the full structure of a tripos.
Some variations
One should regard realizability as just one kind of functional interpretation. In this paper I shall concentrate on the use of restricted realizability and extensional realizability for giving models for extensional type theory with the propositional axiom of choice; but in the last section I make some brief comments on others in the list.
3 Restricted Realizability
The subtripos
The idea of restricted realizability is to take some subcollection R(I) P(I), of the basic collection of truth-values, closed under suitable logical operations. Such subcollections arise naturally when the PCA (A; ) has some additional structure respected by application. For example if A is partially ordered and application preserves the order, then one could require that the truth-values 2 R(I) be downwards or upwards closed. Of course the result may be pretty trivial. 9 However the basic idea is a good one. 10 9 For example if A has a bottom element ? then all nonempty downclosed sets contain ?. It follows that a proposition (i) indexed over i 2 I is determined up to equivalence by the i 2 I for which (i) is empty/non-empty. So the tripos is equivalent to the standard power set tripos on S.
Here I concentrate on one particular kind of example. Suppose that (D; ) is a Scott domain model of the lambda calculus which for simplicity I take to be a complete lattice. Again for simplicity I consider only the restricted realizability tripos R(D) = f 2 P(D) j is closed under _g ; consisting of the _-closed subsets of D.
11
The basic functional structure (>, ! and 8) is inherited from the standard realizability tripos P, and the generic proposition is obvious. Much of the following is then true by de nition.
Proposition 3.1 The restricted realizability tripos R is a functional substructure of the standard realizability tripos P. And R forms an exponential ideal in P: if 2 P and 2 R then ! 2 R. Proof. The signi cant point is that R is an exponential ideal. For that note that we are dealing with Scott domains, so _ on a function space is given pointwise. Thus if f; g : p ! r with r itself _-closed, then f _ g : p ! r.
We can now use Theorem 2.3 to deduce the following basic fact about restricted realizability. 
Assemblies and modest sets
We recall some special full subcategories of the standard realizability models. So assemblies are obtained by just adding subobjects but no quotients. Abstractly the category of assemblies is equivalent to that of the separated objects for the double negation topology. So they form a re ective subcategory in the indexed sense. The de nition of assemblies still makes sense for restricted realizability: again they form a re ective subcategory equivalent to that of the separated objects.
Next there are the modest sets.
12
Concretely these are assemblies (X; j = j) Thus modest sets are assemblies where distinct elements have disjoint realizing sets. Abstractly they are separated objects orthogonal to the codiscrete object 2. For details see Hyland, Robinson and Rosolini 24] where there is an account of the internal and indexed category of such orthogonality classes of objects, the`discrete objects' in any standard realizability topos. Again the de nition of modest sets, their identi cation with the separated objects orthogonal to 2, and their representation as an internal category carry over without di culty for restricted realizability. 13 
Flat sets
The motivation for the objects we now consider comes from experience with the continuous functionals ( Kreisel 29] ) or countable functionals (Kleene 27] ). These were rst proposed in the 1950s in connection on the one hand with the foundations of analysis 14 , and on the other with generalized recursion theory. Kleene's recursion theoretic interests were taken up in the 1970s; and it was also recognized around that time that the continuous functionals are the (global sections of the) higher types in various realizability and sheaf models. Recently the subject has come back into play in connection with Equilogical Spaces (Scott 48] ) and related categories (see in particular Birkedal, Carboni,
Rosolini and Scott 4]).
For us the main point will be the old but unpublished fact that choice principles hold for nite types in appropriate realizability models based on domains with continuous functions. Here we will give one considerable generalization.
Recall that the continuous functionals can be represented as quotients of subspaces of domains as described for example in Hyland 17] . 15 In that treament the domains vary with the types; however using just one universal domain gives exactly the representation as a modest set in the realizability topos. Now the equivalence classes in these representations have a particularly simple form: if D is the equivalence class corresponding to a continuous functional x, then X implies W X 2 and a; b 2 implies a^b 2 .
12 This is Scott's term. I originally called them e ective objects as generalizing the e ective operations (see Hyland 18] ). Most published work on realizability interpretations is concerned with such obects. 13 Thomas Streicher has observed that the representation as an internal category needs attention: he has a de nite negative result for modi ed realizability. There is a natural notion of modest set which is not representable as a small internal category.
14 Remarkably Kreisel's paper also gives the rst account of his modi ed realizability. 15 The basic phenomenon was rst observed by Ershov. There are two sides to this: the equivalence classes are extremely well behaved (one can relate this to various notions of lter or limit space); and the induced topology on the object is something like`Hausdor '.
We do not need conditions quite as speci c as these; but consideration of how the properties of the equivalence classes can be used to prove choice principles for higher types suggests a number of abstract possibilities. We could consider objects X (necessarily modest sets) which are any of the following.
2-replete, that is orthogonal to all 2-equable maps in the sense of 20];
in the internal logic this means that whenever P ! Q induces an isomorphism 2 Q ! 2 P of decidable subsets, then it induces an isomorphism X Q ! X P of maps into X. 2-separated, that is the canonical map X ! 2 2 X is monic; in the internal logic this means that the decidable subsets of X su ce to distinguish elements of X.
Orthogonal (stably) to the natural open subobject classi er; 16 in the internal logic this means that maps from to X are constant.
Of these possibilities the rst two are pretty restrictive. The rst is the most restrictive: it de nes what we might reasonably think of as the pro nite objects, that is, the closure under (co) ltered inverse (or projective) limits of the nite objects. (Here` nite' means`decidable nite'.) The second easily contains the rst; but while it is (presumably) less restrictive it still retains some aspects of total disconnectedness: no reasonable representation of the real numbers can have enough maps into 2 in a constructive universe such as ours. We concentrate on the third which is considerably less restrictive: it e ectively requires just that the order obtained from the intrinsic `topology' be discrete.
For the moment let us de ne an object X to be at just when X is a modest set stably orthogonal to . (We intend this in an internal or indexed sense. A discussion of orthogonality from the indexed point of view is in Hyland and Moggi 22] .) The crucial property of at objects is as the following. Proof. This proposition is essentially obvious by internal category theory. As indicated above each of the conditions can be described internally in the separated part of the topos. Intuitively the objects satisfying any of the conditions are closed under limits; so one can use an internal or indexed adjoint functor theorem to show that the inclusion of the full subcategory has a left adjoint. One rather crude way of making this precise avoiding internal aspects is explained in Hyland and Moggi 22]. The local cartesian closedness is also (not very obviously I am afraid) in 22]. By general category theory, the internal completeness and cocompleteness follow from the corresponding properties for modest sets.
Realizing the axiom of choice
Recall that we are considering the restricted realizability subtripos R of a suitable realizability tripos P. We regard S R] as a subtopos of S P], taking objects from the former but using the logic of the latter. Our basic result is the following. 17 There is a good and more accessible account of the issues in Robinson 44] . seperable in the subtopos S R] then we have a _ a 0 also a code for x 2 X. So we have c 1 a; c 1 a 0 c 1 (a _ a 0 ) all codes for some y 2 Y . Thus there is a function f : X ! Y tracked and so realized by c 1 ; and then c 2 gives a realizer for (x; f(x)). This completes the proof.
It is as well to stress the importance of sticking with the logic of S P]: it seems very di cult to calculate in the logic of S R]. Note that as a consequence we do not have a subobject bration as in the formulation of Maietti's question.
We can consider our model of at objects from two points of view. First we can take the point of view of the topos S P]. Theorem 3.6 The collection of at objects of S R] forms an internal locally cartesian closed category in S P] complete and cocomplete for separable diagrams; and the propositional axiom of choice holds in S P] for all such objects.
Secondly we can relate the at objects to Maietti's question. The propositional axiom of choice holds in the poset bration. T has quotients for P-equivalence relations. 18 Proof. For the last point take the quotient in S P] and then re ect.
This example is poor from the point of view of Maietti's question. It seems that our quotients do not have good stability properties. So while we do model a weak form of quotient type, we do not model quotient types in the strong sense of dependent type theory (see Hofmann 16] for details).
Extensional Realizability
The local localic extension
The idea of extensional realizability is old, but should be well known as it provides about the simplest case of Lawvere's`unity and identity of opposites' (see for example Lawvere 30] ) in the context of realizability toposes. Suppose that (A; ) is a partial applicative structure. Then we have the standard tripos P of ordinary realizability: P(I) = (P (A) I ;`) :
But we can also consider another tripos:
PER(I) = (PER(A) I ;`) 18 The treatment of quotients in Jacobs 25] should make clear what is intended.
whose elements are I-indexed families of the PERs or modest sets of ordinary realizability, and whose preorder is the preorder re ection of the indexed category of`I-indexed PERs'.
Let f : PER ! P be de ned by f( ) = j j, the eld of de nition of the partial equivalence relation ; and for a subset of the PCA let d( ) be with the discrete equivalence relation, and c( ) be with the codiscrete or chaotic equivalence relation. In fact we can say a bit more about these geometric morphisms. 
Realizing the axiom of choice
Extensional realizability is more familiar than restricted realizability and easy to calculate with. The propositional axiom of choice holds in the poset bration.
T has stable quotients for P-equivalence relations.
Proof. For the last point take the quotient in S PER] and then re ect. As f is left exact (it has a left adjoint) the stability properties of quotients are inherited from the extensional modest sets.
A Panorama of Functional Interpretation
Other variations
Relative realizability This idea goes back to . Suppose that (B; ) is a subPCA of (A; ) that is a subapplicative structure of (A; ) containing k and s. Then Modi ed realizability Kreisel 29] introduced typed modi ed realizability quite explicitly as a functional interpretation. The most obvious feature is that modi ed realizability refutes Markov's principle (see Troelstra 52] for example). The untyped form of modi ed realiability leading to toposes comes originally from Troelstra 52] . (In the context of this paper a warning is perhaps in order. Troelstra explains that in the intensional (non-extensional) context (cf HRO and ICF below) modi ed realizability validates the propositional axiom of choice; but that does not hold for the extensional hierarchy. 20 
)
An extremely general setting for modi ed realizability employing a weakening of the notion of a PCA was developed by Hyland 31] at the Workshop addressed aspects of the interplay between typed and untyped realizability. One result which is signi cant in this contex is a theorem of Bezem 3] which we brie y explain. In any standard realizability topos there is a weakly cartesian closed category whose objects are closed subobjects of the natural modest set of realizers. Take either the e ective topos or the topos based on Kleene's function application. The natural numbers object is an object of this weakly cartesian closed subcategory so we can take the higher types over it: we get in a natural way the hereditarily recursive operations HRO in one case and the intensional continuous functionals ICF in the other. Now we can take the subquotients HRO E and ICF E respectively given by hereditarily requiring extensionality. The standard extensional higher types on the other hand are the hereditarily e ective operations HEO and the standard (extensional) continuous functionals ECF respectively. Then we have the following. Now HRO E and ICF E correspond to higher types in modi ed realizability toposes, while HEO and ECF correspond to higher types in realizability topses. One would not generally expect these to coincide, so it would be good to understand better how continuity is used in Bezem's argument.
Dialectica style interpretations I believe that the (idea of the) Dialectica interpretation also gives rise to a range of realizability-like triposes. One idea already in Girard 12] is that of giving a Dialectica interpretation to higher order logic using the impredicative theory of functions F ! ; there is a brief conceptual analysis in Troelstra 52] .
Re ection on Troelstra's discussion of the various functional interpretations suggests a simple interpretation of which I give a brief outline. Assume (N; ) is the standard Kleene applicative system in the convenient form used by Troelstra 52] for his version of modi ed realizability for the theory of species (i.e. The beautiful and mathematically natural Diller-Nahm 10] variant of the Dialectica interpretation and its variants (for which see Diller 9] and Stein 49] ) can also be treated as above, and thus give rise to toposes. Generally the investigations of the M unster school deserve to be better known and understood: for example there has been some very interesting work on interpreting constructive set theory by Burr 5] using an extension of the ideas of Diller-Nahm. We do not have an explanation of this interpretation in terms of categorical proof theory and so it presents an interesting challenge to the abstract point of view.
Unfortunately the possibility sketched above is really not faithful to the original Dialectica interpretation: we have lost the decidability of the basic predicates. And my memory is that when I looked at this model in the early 1980s I found its properties disappointing, presumably in the sense that one got little of what one expected to get from a Dialectica interpretation. 21 As I mentioned earlier there are other possibilities more closely following Girard's use of typed impredicative functions; these might do better, but I do not know that they have ever been investigated.
Iterations of triposes These can be used in many ways. Most obviously they give an elegant account of old proof theoretically motivated variants of realizability such as q-realizability and mq-realizability (see Troelstra 52] ). The resulting toposes can also be obtained by glueing. Perhaps the most telling use of iteration is in the proof of Goodman's Theorem (see 13]). Goodman shows that the propositional axiom of choice is conservative over Heyting Arithmetic with intensional higher types. Beeson 2] gives an analysis of a proof using a realizability extension of a sheaf model: the sheaf model is used to create a generic function N ! N, and then we use Kleene application for functions recursive in the generic function as oracle. By varying the realizability, Beeson was able to extend the result to extensional higher types. Theorem 5.3 (Beeson) Take Heyting arithmetic extended with higher function types. The propositional axiom of choice together with extensionality at these higher types is conservative over Heyting arithmetic. This may relate to Maietti's question: there is a way to force the axiom of choice over extensional types leaving rst order properties untouched. It seems possible that if we understood Beeson's technique from a topos theoretic perspective that might shed light on the problem. 21 Since I may not have had the right de nition, this memory may not be very signi cant!
Final thoughts
Perhaps the most natural computational perspective on realizability is that insight is obtained by varying the underlying PCA. The idea is that distinct PCAs correspond to distinct computational paradigms and these show up in the logic of the corresponding topos. Compelling support for this point of view was provided by Longley's analysis of exact functors between standard realizability toposes. He gives a convincing computational counterpart in his notion of applicative morphism (see Longley 32]) .
By contrast what I have tried to do here is to give some impression of the rich panorama of models which can be obtained from the general notion of a functional interpretation by varying the style and avour of the interpretation. Perhaps it is not clear exactly how to think of this from a computational point of view; but if we look carefully at examples, something may emerge. At least the existence of this range of possibilities challenges any simplistic view of the primacy of the standard realizability models. Anyway there is plenty of work to do. My nal hope is to have shown that it will help to treat the models from an abstract point of view.
